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NAVIGATING THE SAFE HARBOR: GUIDANCE
FROM THE COURTS ON QUALIFYING FOR THE 35
U.S.C. 271(E)(1) EXEMPTION FROM PATENT
INFRINGEMENT OF HEALTH CARE RELATED
INVENTIONS
Sarah J. Chickos*
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(E)(1): THE SAFE HARBOR
The Safe Harbor provision of the Patent Act of 19841 (also know as the
"Hatch-Waxman Act" or "the Act") provides an exemption for patent
infringement for those uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under the federal laws
regulating drugs and medical devices. 2 The Safe Harbor provision is a
critical "port in the storm," allowing companies to use patented inventions in
the service of obtaining regulatory approval for drugs and medical devices.
Courts have been fleshing out the boundaries of this exemption since 1984,
and these decisions provide valuable guidance for companies seeking to
bring new drugs and devices to market and advance the healthcare field.
This article aims to survey these decisions to determine the scope and extent
of this exemption and how litigants can best establish this exemption for
their activities.
* Associate at Covington & Burling LLP in Washington, DC; Ms. Chickos specializes in
pharmaceutical patent litigation. Ms. Chickos received her B.S. in chemistry, with
honors, from the University of Missouri-Columbia. Ms. Chickos received her J.D. from
the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, where she served as an editor of the
Missouri Law Review. The author wishes to thank Kelley Clements for all of her
encouragement and assistance with this article and Dr. James Chickos and Mary Chickos
for inspiring her to write it.
1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 5 U.S.C. §§
68(b)-68(c), 70(b) (2000); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000);
35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides "[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make,
use, offer to sell, or sell ... a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use or sale of drugs."
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. XXIV:35
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 to reconcile the goals
of the patent statutes with the realities of obtaining regulatory approval for
drugs and medical devices. Obtaining regulatory approval to market drugs
and devices took so long that it was causing "distortions" of the terms of the
relevant patents. These distortions occurred at both the beginning and end of
patent terms. At the beginning of a patent term, obtaining regulatory
approval to market a drug or device took significantly longer than the time it
took to obtain a patent, so that much of the patent term had run before a
company was able to actually market the drug. Thus, companies launching a
new drug or device had little of the patent term left to sell that drug or
device. At the end of the patent term, an unintended extension of the patent
term occurred because competitor companies, including generic companies,
had to wait until the patent term had expired before beginning to test and
develop the drug or device covered by the patent. This amounted to an
extension of the monopoly by the patent holder.
Congress addressed the unintended effects of regulatory activity via the
Hatch-Waxman Act. In § 202 of the Act, Congress provided a "Safe
Harbor" against patent infringement by creating 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
Section 271(e)(1) allows competitors of the patent holder to comply with
regulatory laws and bring their products to market sooner than was possible
before the passage of the Act. Congress wanted to encourage both
innovation and competition. Indeed, Congress declared that one of the
purposes of the Act was to encourage both innovation and the ability to
bring new drug products to market more quickly while still upholding patent
rights.3 Section 201 of the Act addressed the distortion at the early end of
the patent term caused by the patentee being unable to market his invention
while seeking regulatory approval by creating a new statutory provision,
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156. Section 156 provides a patent term extension
for patented inventions that are subject to lengthy regulatory approval
processes.
II. OVERALL TEST: MERCK V. KGAA v. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD.
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 271(e)(1) broadly so that this
exemption "extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably
related to the development and submission of any information under the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act."4 The overall test is an objective one
3. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1585) 2678.
4. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005); Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000) (enacted by Congress to
oversee the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics in the United States).
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that asks whether a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a
patented product may work and uses the product in research that, if
successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). If such a reasonable basis exists, then the Safe
Harbor protection applies to the use of the patented technology research.5
Provided this objective reasonable basis test is met, a broad spectrum of
activities can be undertaken.
On each occasion that it has interpreted it, the Supreme Court has declined
to limit the scope of the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor Exemption. In Eli Lilly v.
Medtronic Inc.,6 the Court declined to limit the exemption from
infringement to activities generating submissions under the particular
statutory provisions that regulate drugs.7  In Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., the Supreme Court expressly rejected any restriction on
the Safe Harbor exemption limiting it to preclinical data relating to the
safety of a drug in humans. 8 Instead, the Court reemphasized that the
reasonable relation language of § 271(e)(1) applied to all uses of patented
inventions and the submission of any information under the FDCA,
regardless of the development phase in which it was generated. 9
111. ACTIVITIES "REASONABLY RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND
SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION"
Much of the case law has focused on determining, on a factual basis,
which activities are reasonably related to the development and submission of
information to the FDA. 10  There are various stages to the activities
conducted to obtain regulatory approval. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
5. Merck, 545 U.S. at 202; see 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5) (2007).
6. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
7. Id.
8. Merck, 545 U.S. at 203.
9. Id. at 205-06.
10. See, e.g., Merck, 545 U.S. 193; Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661; Chartex Int'l PLC v.
M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., No. 92-1556, 1993 WL 306169 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 1993);
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Amgen,
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998); NeoRX Corp.
v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
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(FDCA),"1 is "a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs."' 12 The FDCA separates new drug development into general stages,
each of which requires the submission of certain research data to the FDA.
In the pre-clinical stage, an investigational new drug application (IND) is
submitted to obtain authorization to conduct tests in humans (clinical trials).
The FDCA, in § 355(i)(1)(A), states that the IND must contain information
about "preclinical tests (including tests on animals) of such drug adequate to
justify the proposed clinical testing."' 3 In the clinical stage, approval to
market the new drug is sought in a New Drug Application (NDA). The
NDA must describe all clinical studies and preclinical studies relating to a
drug's efficacy, toxicity, and pharmacology to demonstrate that the drug is
both safe and effective. 14 However, the requirements for information do not
cease after approval to market the new drug has been obtained, and
additional information must be submitted to the FDA in the post-approval
stage regarding an approved drug's performance, especially regarding
safety.'"
The regulatory framework governing medical devices is different than that
of drugs, and the specific regulatory requirements depend on how the
medical device is classified. Medical devices are classified in three
categories based on the risk posed by their use. 16 Devices that do not
"present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and do not purport
to be used for sustaining human life are designated Class I medical
devices."' 17  Class I medical devices are subject to minimal regulation
through "general controls."' 8  Potentially more harmful devices are
designated Class II devices and although they may be marketed without
advance approval, Class II devices are subject to federal performance
11. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665-66, 674.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1)(A).
14. See 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(2), (d)(5) (2007).
15. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80(c)(2), 314.98, 600.80(c) (2007).
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2000).
17. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
18. Id.
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regulations known as "special controls."' 9  A device that "presents a
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" or that is "purported or
represented to be for a use in sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health" is
designated a Class Ill medical device."
2 0
Class III medical devices require pre-market approval or must meet
performance standards before they can be shipped in interstate commerce for
use in human subjects. An Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) may be
obtained from the FDA, however, to allow for investigational use pursuant
to an FDA-approved protocol. 2' Clinical trials and experiments can be
conducted with an IDE in order to generate the data necessary to obtain FDA
approval for the Class III medical device. Similar to an IND in the case of
drugs, an application for the IDE generally proposes an investigational plan
for clinical testing of the device with a written protocol demonstrating the
scientific soundness of the investigation. Thus, in the case of both drugs
and medical devices, there are various stages of regulatory approval, each
with its own data requirements.
A. Protected Activities: Reasonable Basis for Belief?.
In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,23 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether preclinical studies qualified for the §
271(e)(1) exemption from patent infringement. The Court held that the use
of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under the Safe
Harbor exemption provided that there is a reasonable basis for belief that the
experiments will produce the types of information relevant to a submission
24to the FDA. In Merck, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. and the Burnham
Institute sued Merck KGaA for infringement and inducement of
infringement of five patents related to the tripeptide sequence Arg-Gly-Asp
(the "RGD peptide") during angiogenesis research. 25 Early research using
19. Id. § 360c(a)(l)(B).
20. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
21. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.1 (2007).
22. See id. §§ 812.3, 912.25.
23. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 197.
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an RGD peptide succeeded in reversing tumor growth in chicken embryos.
This led to RGD peptides being tested both in vitro and in vivo. The RGD
peptides were tested for efficacy, specificity, and toxicity as angiogenesis
inhibitors, and their mechanism of action and pharmacokinetics were studied
to determine which peptides were suitable drug candidates. Upon
determination of a suitable candidate, the test results were to be included in
an application for an IND from the FDA. The district court found that these
research activities were not protected by § 271(e)(1) and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed on the ground that the research was
"not clinical testing to supply information to the FDA but only 2eneral
biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds."2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically to review the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals's construction of § 271 (e)(1). 27
The Supreme Court stated, at the outset of its opinion, that the statutory
text made it apparent that § 271(e)(l)'s exemption extended to all uses of
patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development of any
information under the FDCA. The Court then referenced the Eli Lilly
decision in which the Court declined to limit § 271(e)(1) exemption to
portions of statute that regulate drugs.28 The Court explained that "[t]here is
simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information from the
exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed or
the particular submission in which it could be included., 29 The Court also
rejected respondents' arguments that the only preclinical data of interest to
the FDA are that which pertain to the safety of the drug in humans, not the
drug's efficacy, mechanism of action, and pharmacokinetics data.
30
The Supreme Court's analysis in Merck demonstrates how FDA
requirements and guidelines are often central to a court's determination of
whether an activity qualifies for the § 271 (e)(1) Safe Harbor exemption from
infringement. The Court focused on the process of drug development and
the requirements for data submission at each phase of the process. The
26. Id. at 201 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d 860,
866 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
27. Id. at 202.
28. Merck, 545 U.S. at 202.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 203.
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Court pointed to the FDA's requirement that an IND application include
summaries of the drug's pharmacological, toxicological, pharmacokinetic,
and biological aspects in animals. 3' The source of these data is usually
preclinical in vitro and in vivo studies. 32 Additional reasoning for the Court
came from an FDA directive that an IND must provide sufficient
information to allow a detailed risk-benefit analysis to be made, the source
of which is also usually preclinical in vitro and in vivo studies.
33
1. Experimentation on Drugs That Are Not Ultimately the Subject
ofAn FDA Submission Are Not Excluded From Exemption
The Supreme Court described § 271(e)(1) as providing a researcher with a
wide berth for experimentation and failure and explained that
at least where a drug maker has a reasonable basis for believing that a
patented compound may work, through a particular biological
process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the
compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to
include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 'reasonably related' to
the development and submission of information under . . . Federal
law.
34
In articulating the reasonable basis test in Merck, the Supreme Court was
cognizant of the realities of new drug development and the process of trial
and error. The Court appreciated that, in most cases, those involved with
developing a drug had no way of knowing whether new drug candidates
would ultimately be successful and understood that the fear of failed
experimentation would be a disincentive for researchers to experiment. In
laying out the reasonable basis test the Court particularly pointed out that
31. See Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Guidance for Industry, Good Clinical
Practice: Consolidated Guidance 45 (Apr. 1996)
The results of all relevant nonclinical pharmacology, toxicology,
pharmacokinetic, and investigational product metabolism studies
should be provided in summary form. This summary should address
the methodology used, the results, and a discussion of the relevance
of the findings to the investigated therapeutic and the possible
unfavorable and unintended effects in humans.
Id.
32. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 203 (2005).
33. Id. at 203-04.
34. 1d. at 207.
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"[p]roperly construed, § 27 1(e)(l) leaves adequate space for experimentation• ,,35
and failure on the road to regulatory approval.
2. Use of Patented Compounds in Experiments That Are Not
Ultimately Submitted to the FDA Are Not Excluded From the Safe
Harbor
The experiment with the drug does not have to ultimately be submitted to
the FDA, provided that the researcher has a reasonable basis to believe that
the experiment could produce information relevant to a regulatory
submission under federal law. 36  As such, testing conducted during the
clinical stage does not have to be submitted to a regulatory agency to qualify
for Safe Harbor protection. Safety testing is one of several types of tests that
courts have determined to be protected by the Safe Harbor exemption even
when the results are never submitted to the FDA. In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc.,3 7 Amgen brought an infringement action based on
several of its patents covering a recombinant form of erythropoietin (EPO).
Pyrogens are fever-inducing agents that are often considered to be
impurities. The FDA requires that biological pharmaceuticals undergo
purity tests to detect the presence of pyrogens. Hoechst had performed two
kinds of purity tests for pyrogens on its EPO product, a Limulus Amebocyte
Lysate (LAL) test and a test in which the EPO was injected into rabbits.
38
Hoechst submitted the LAL purity test results to the FDA but never
submitted the rabbit pyrogen tests. Amgen argued that LAL test was not
reasonably related to FDA approval and was conducted to satisfy European
regulatory requirements. 39 Hoescht replied that, while not reported to the
FDA, the results of the rabbit pyrogen tests were conducted to confirm the
purity and safety of their EPO product for use in clinical trials, which would
be submitted to the FDA.40 The Amgen court held that the rabbit pyrogen
tests were reasonably related to the approval process and that any suggestion
35. Id.
36. Id.




40. Id. at I10.
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that Hoechst had other purposes in conducting the rabbit pyrogen tests was
irrelevant.4'
3. Provision of Raw Materials Protected by Safe Harbor
The provision of raw materials to a company so that it may in turn prepare
its Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) is protected from
infringement under the Safe Harbor exemption.42  In Ortho-McNeil
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., Ortho-McNeil made a
motion to amend its complaint of patent infringement against Mylan
Laboratories in order to add inducement of patent infringement claims
against raw material suppliers Quimica and Betachem.43 The only allegation
in the proposed Amended Complaint was that Quimica and Betachem
provided Mylan with the raw materials for its ANDA preparations.4 The
court determined that this activity was excelted from infringement by §
271(e)(1) and denied Ortho-McNeil's motion.
4. "Commercial Reasons " and "Alternate Purposes " Do Not
Preclude Coverage for Uses Reasonably Related to Obtaining FDA
Approval
Uses that are related to FDA approval can be conducted for purposes other
than, or in addition to, obtaining FDA approval. Examples of such uses
include animal testing, human clinical trials, and chemical composition
analysis. 46  Ulterior motives or alternate purposes do not preclude
application of the Safe Harbor exemption.47  Indeed, once the use is
determined to be qualified for the § 2 71(e)(1) exemption, courts have
41. Id.
42. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549
(N.D. W. Va. 2003).
43. Id. at 547.
44. Id. at 549.
45. Id.
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regarded the defendant's intent or the underlying purpose of the activity as
"statutorily irrelevant., 48
a. Trade Shows
In Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,49 Ventritex
demonstrated its defibrillator to some non-physicians at medical
conferences. Telectronics alleged the demonstrations were not reasonably
related to FDA approval, and Ventritex replied that all of its demonstrations
had been set up to procure clinical investigators. 50  The Federal Circuit
found that such demonstrations constitute a protected use that is reasonably
related to obtaining FDA approval because device sponsors are required to
select qualified investigators and Rrovide them with the information
necessary to conduct clinical testing. The court dismissed as unimportant
the fact that some non-physicians had seen the device at the conferences on
the ground that such an occurrence is unable to detract from the conclusion
that the uses satisfied the requirements of § 271(e)( 1).52 The court found it
significant that Telectronics admitted that the demonstrations did not
constitute a sale or an offer to sell.53
Similarly, in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co.,54 the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed that trade show displays that are used to obtain necessary
information for clinical testing are exempt under § 271(e)(1). Ventritex
demonstrated an implantable defibrillator at trade shows even after Ventritex
had procured all of the clinical investigators that it needed.55 The Federal
48. Id. at 108.
49. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1521 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
50. Id. at 1522-23.




54. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co.. Inc., No. 92-1076, 1993 WL 87405, at *3
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993) (citing Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1525).
55. Id.
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Circuit recognized that it was unforeseeable how much data the FDA would
require for submission during the approval process, so efforts to continue
finding potential clinical investigators well into the approval process did not
56
negate the demonstrations' qualifications for the § 271(e)(1) exemption.
The court noted that Intermedics did not contest the trial court's finding that
there were no implantable defibrillator sales.
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that displays at trade shows to obtain
necessary clinical testing information are exempt under § 271(e)(1) in
Chartex International PLC v. MD. Personal Products Corp.57 In Chartex,
M.D. Personal Products Corporation (MDPP) made three trade show
58
displays of its medical device, a female condom. The court noted that the
record contained no evidence that MDPP made or solicited any sales of its
female condom. 59 Chartex's failure to dispute the district court's finding to
this effect was also mentioned in the court's opinion. 60 As such, the lack of
any sales activity at trade show demonstrations is a persuasive factor in §
271 (e)(l ) exemption determinations.
b. Consumer Surveys
In Chartex, the Federal Circuit also addressed the issue of whether
consumer surveys were exempt activity under § 271(e)(1). 6 1 MDPP had
conducted three consumer studies in the form of focus groups, color tests,
and interviews, and MDPP subsequently used the information they provided
in designing the female condom. MDPP proceeded with clinical testing on
the condom that was designed from the consumer survey information and
then submitted the testing data to the FDA.63 The Federal Circuit concluded
56. Id.
57. Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., No. 92-1556, 1993 WL 306169, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 1993) (citing Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1523).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. at*3.
62. Id.
63. Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., No. 92-1556, 1993 WL 306169, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 1993).
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that the MDPP's consumer studies were exempt under § 271(e)(l) because
they were directed at developing information required for FDA approval.
64
c. Commercial Scale Production
Experiments can actually be conducted specifically for commercial
reasons, and any information that they produce can still be submitted to the
FDA.65 Indeed, even activities not traditionally associated with obtaining
regulatory approval, such as increased product production and scale-ups of
offending products, are protected under the Safe Harbor exemption if they
are reasonably related to obtaining regulatory approval.66
An example of increased product production is found in NeoRX Corp. v.
Immunomedics, Inc.6 7 NeoRX sued Immunomedics to enforce its patent to
processes and products for radiolabeling proteins that detect and treat
cancer.68  Although Immunomedics had increased production of
ImmuRAID, the District Court of New Jersey held that Immunomedics'
stockpiling of ImmuRAID-CEA for sale was reasonably related to the FDA
approval process.69 In focusing on the FDA's requirements, the district
court highlighted that it is an FDA requirement that an applicant provide
evidence it can manufacture the product on a commercial scale.7v
The court reasoned that the FDA's knowledge of the scale-up production
plans, coupled with the unpredictability of the FDA's information demands,
made the increased production plans reasonably related to the development
and submission of information to the FDA.71 In reaching the determination
that the FDA was aware of Immunomedics' scale-up production plans, the
court looked at the minutes of a meeting between the FDA and
64. Id.
65. Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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Immunomedics. Those minutes revealed that the parties discussed the scale-
up, as well as a manufacturing report submitted to the FDA that discussed
72production increases and scale-up plans. In reaching its holding, the court
acknowledged the unforeseeability of the amount of data the FDA will
ultimately require, referencing the Federal Circuit's Intermedics decision
recognizing this uncertainty.
73
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. provides another example of
commercial scale production. 74 Hoechst Marion Roussel had produced at
least four commercial scale production batches of the allegedly infringing
product, GA-EPO.75  The court pointed to the FDA requirement "that a
manufacturer demonstrate the consistency of its manufacturing process by
producing three consecutive batches within certain tolerances of a standard
reference. 76 The court held the production of the batches fell within the §
271(e)(1) exemption and dismissed the fact that the batches were never
submitted to the FDA to satisfy the consistency requirement.
77
d. Collateral Use of Data
Once data have been submitted to the FDA, the subsequent use of the
same data is not an infringing act.78 For example, in NeoRX Corp. v.
Immunomedics, Inc., Immunomedics submitted foreign clinical data to a
European regulatory body to obtain a European Product Marketing
Authorization after submitting the foreign clinical data to the FDA.79  The
72. Id. at 207 n.4.
73. NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 206-07 (D.N.J. 1994).
74. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 120 (D. Mass.




78. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
79. NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 208 (D.N.J. 1994).
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court held that the submission of the data to the European regulatory body
was not an infringing act.
80
In Telectronics, Ventritex presented clinical trial data at a cardiology
conference, informed investors, analysts, and the press about the progress of
clinical trials, and discussed the clinical trials in written private fundraising
communications.8' The Federal Circuit rejected Telectronic's argument that
the disclosure of clinical trial data to persons other than the FDA somehow
revoked the § 271(e)(1) exemption for the underlying clinical trials.8 2 The
Federal Circuit flatly stated that § 271(e)(1) provided for no such
possibility.83 Furthermore, a coordinated effort to obtain regulatory approval
in the United States and foreign countries can be conducted using the same
package of data and clinical studies and the § 271(e)(1) exemption will still
apply to the appropriate activities.
84
5. Protection Available After Approval
The protection of the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor exemption continues to be
available to qualifying activity once regulatory approval has been obtained.
Repeatedly, courts have held that the § 271(e)(1) exemption applies when
the reasonably related test is met, even if a drug has been approved by the
FDA and is already on the market.
8 5
In Classen Immumotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, defendant Biogen
IDEC conducted a study to evaluate possible associations between the
timing of vaccinations against Hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenza and
the risk of developing Type I diabetes.86 The United States District Court
for the District of Maryland cited the Supreme Court's decision in Merck
and held that participation in a study evaluating risks associated with various
80. Id.
81. Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1523.
82. Id. at 1524.
83. Id.
84. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 100 (D.
Mass 1998).
85. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455-56
(D. Md. 2005).
86. Id. at 455.
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vaccine schedules were protected activities under the § 271(e)(1) exemption
because they were reasonably related to the development and submission of
information required under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
87
The court specifically noted that the FDA collects vaccine data from vaccine
manufacturers after their vaccines have been approved and pointed to
provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations requiring annual progress
reports of postmarketing studies and reports of postmarketing adverse
reactions to vaccinations. 8
6. Exporting Product Does Not Constitute Infringement
It is worth noting that the exporting or shipping abroad of a product is not
an infringing activity, not by virtue of any exemption under § 271(e)(1), but
because it does not constitute infringement under § 271(a) in the first
place. 89 Similarly, receiving, storing, or shipping _products are also not
"uses" and therefore do not amount to infringements.
B. Unprotected Activities
1. Purely Commercial and Promotional Use in the United States or
Abroad Is Not Covered by the Safe Harbor Exemption
Sales in the United States or abroad that are purely for profit and are
without a regulatory information generating purpose have been determined
to be unprotected by the Safe Harbor exemption from infringement. 91 The
Safe Harbor exemption is available for activities that are necessary to obtain
87. Id. at 456.
88. Id. at 455; see also 21 C.F.R. § 601.70 (2005) (requiring annual progress reports
of postmarketing studies); 21 C.F.R. § 600.80 (requiring postmarket reports of adverse
experiences).
89. See Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231 (D.
Del. 2003); Amgen, Inc. v. Elanex Pharm., Inc., No. C93-1483D, 1996 WL 84590, at *3-
4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 1996).
90. Quantum Group, Inc. v. Am. Sensor, Inc., No. 96 C 0761, 1998 WL 171837, at
*6 (W.D. 11. April 19, 1998).
91. Ventrasisst PTY Ltd. v. Heartware Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (S.D. Fla.
2005); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, No. 90-0242, 1990 WL 121353, at *23 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 17, 1990) (stating that promotional or commercial use in the United States or abroad
is not exempt under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
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regulatory approval in the United States; however, courts have found that
this exemption does not apply to activities conducted in pursuit of obtaining
regulatory approval in foreign countries, absent a reasonable relation to
United States regulatory approval. Thus, in NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics,
Inc., the manufacture and shipping abroad of infringing products for labeling
proteins was not protected under the Safe Harbor exemption when it was
only for the purpose of obtaining foreign regulatory approval.92
On the other hand, manufacture and shipping abroad has been found to be
protected when it can generate information that may be useful in obtaining
FDA approval. Specifically, manufacture and shipping abroad has been
protected when it is done for the purpose of evaluating an alternative
manufacturing process. In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
Amgen brought an infringement action based on several of its patents
covering a recombinant form of erythropoietin (EPO).93 Hoechst had made
and exported a quantity of EPO to a Japanese affiliate for use as a standard
reference in studies being conducted to evaluate an alternative
manufacturing process. 94  Amgen argued that this activity was not
reasonably related to FDA approval because the alternative manufacturing
process was not the process for which FDA approval was sought and no
approval had even been sought for the alternative manufacturing process.
95
Hoescht replied to this argument with the assertion that the Japanese study is
one of several efforts to improve its manufacturing process and FDA
approval will not be sought on these alternative manufacturing processes
until the FDA has approved the current process. 96 The court in Amgen held
that Hoescht's activities were protected by the Safe Harbor exemption,
regardless of whether Hoescht had sought FDA approval on the alternative
manufacturing process at the time. 97 The court particularly noted that "the
FDA guidelines contemplate the use of a reference standard sample from
one manufacturing process to evaluate the effects of alterations in that
92. NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 202, 207 (D.N.J. 1994).
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process. ' 98 Thus, the nature of the information that can be produced in
carrying out the activity is central to any analysis of whether manufacture
and shipping abroad falls under the ambit of the Safe Harbor exemption.
2. Limits of the Safe Harbor: Insufficient Evidence
Since the Supreme Court's 2005 Merck decision, courts have addressed
situations where the limits of the Safe Harbor exemption were at issue. 99 In
Third Wave Technologies, Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., the Western District of
Wisconsin held that in the absence of defendant's straightforward assertion
that past testing of products was performed in order to develop or submit
information to the FDA, the mere assertion that FDA approval was
motivation for past testing was insufficient evidence to establish a Safe
Harbor exemption. 100 The court explained that the statement of defendant's
CEO that its testing was driven in part by the desire to eventually expand the
utility of the products and submit products using the platform for FDA
approval was also insufficient in light of the CEO's admission that defendant
was only in the start up phase for pursuing the diagnostics market for this
product.101  Thus, defendants have some evidence to establish the §
271(e)(1) defense from patent infringement. According to the Third Wave
court, it is not sufficient just to claim that testing or experimentation is part
of a future desire to expand into a market requiring regulatory approval;
defendants must also be prepared to show a concrete relationship between its
past activities and its future intent to seek regulatory approval.
2
Defendants cannot just invoke the Safe Harbor exemption defense to protect
themselves from an assertion of patent infringement. The court emphasized
the need for evidence that would show a more concrete relationship between
past testing and the future intent to seek FDA approval.
10 3
98. Amgen, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 109; see Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research
& Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA Guidance Concerning Demonstration of
Comparability of Human Biological Prods. 3-6 (1994).
99. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal.
2006); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D.
Md. 2005); Third Wave Techs. v. Stratagene Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Wis.
2005).
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The Third Wave decision highlights the benefits of having business
development plans and other documentation about particular markets that a
company's products could be launched in. Companies can more easily
establish this defense by maintaining records of business plans, business
development plans, and marketing research as they relates to the penetration
of a desired market subject to regulation. This type of documentation could
be useful in establishing a concrete relationship between past activities and a
company's future intent to penetrate a market in which its product would be
subject to regulation. Additional helpful documentation would include
records of past activities in order to more clearly explain the relationship.
The Third Wave court appeared uncomfortable with defendant CEO's stated
desire to enter a market that was expressed during the litigation process as
the only evidence presented. Proper record keeping would provide adequate
documentation preceding litigation with which a court would be more
comfortable.
IV. "[A] PATENTED INVENTION"
A. Medical Devices: Eli Lilly v. Medtronic Inc.
In Eli Lilly, the Supreme Court broadly held that the term "patented
invention" as used in § 271(e)(1) includes all inventions, not just drug-
related inventions.10 4 In this case, Eli Lilly owned patents of ventricular
defibrillation devices and sued to enjoin Medtronic from testing and
marketing a ventricular defibrillation device.10 5 Medtronic asserted that its
activities were exempt from infringement under § 271(e)(1) because it was
trying to develop and submit information to the government to obtain
premarketing approval for the device under § 515 of the FDCA. Medtronic
argued that the phrase "a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use,
or sale of drugs" referred to the entirety of any Act, including the FDCA,
whose provisions regulate drugs and other devices, rather than those
individual provisions of federal law that only regulate drugs, as Eli Lilly
argued. 106 The district court concluded that § 271(e)(1) did not apply to
medical devices and found that Medtronic infringed Eli Lilly's patents. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed on the basis that
Medtronic's activities were undertaken to obtain regulatory approval under
104. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
105. Id. at 661.
106. Id.
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the FDCA and were exempt from a finding of infringement under §
271(e)(l).' °7
The Supreme Court looked to the statutory language and reasoned that the
word "law" was most likely being used in its broader sense. °8 The phrase
"a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs" more
naturally refers to a statutory scheme in its entirety, as opposed to a single
provision. 10 9 Likewise, the phrase "the development and submission of
information under a Federal law" suggests that actions are taken in
compliance with an overall regulatory scheme. 110 Also persuasive to the
Court was that the immediately preceeding § 201 of the 1984 Act used the
phrase "the provision" when it meant to refer to particular provisions of the
law rather than an entire Act.' The Court, recognizing the ambiguity in the
phrase "a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs," held that § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of patented
inventions, including medical devices, that are reasonably related to
obtaining approval under the FDCA.
112
Since the Supreme Court decided Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit has
reiterated that the § 271(e)(1) exemption applies to all patented inventions
and is not limited to those patented inventions listed in § 156 of the Hatch
Waxman Act. 13 The Federal Circuit has applied the Supreme Court's Eli
Lilly holding in Chartex International PLC v. MD. Personal Products
Corp.114 and Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp."15 in concluding that both Class I
and Class II medical devices are among the patented inventions
encompassed by the FDCA. In Abtox, the medical device at issue was a
107. Id.
108. Id. at 667.
109. Id. at 666.
1I0. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 667 (1990).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 661.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2000).
114. Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., 5 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
115. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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plasma sterilizer, a Class II medical device.1 6 The patentee sought to
distinguish the holding in Eli Lilly on the basis that the defibrillation device
at issue was a Class III medical device, whereas the plasma sterilizer at issue
was a Class II medical device.11 7  The patentee emphasized the more
involved regulatory requirements for Class III devices, but the Federal
Circuit rejected this distinction and applied the broad holding in Eli Lilly to
exempt the use of the plasma sterilizer from infringement under §
271(e)(1)."' Likewise, in Chartex, the Federal Circuit held that M.D.
Personal Products' female condom was a medical device that the § 271 (e)(1)
exemption applied pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Eli Lilly.
11 9
The female condom at issue in Chartex was a Class I medical device.'
20
Examples of patented inventions that have been determined to be covered by
the § 271(e)(1) exemption by courts include a drug containing an adhesive
transdermal patch,' an implantable cardiac defibrillator,
22 a plasma
sterilizing medical device, the active ingredient in an anti-ulcer12412
medication, 124 an oral contraceptive, 25 a hormone that stimulates red blood




119. Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., No. 92-1556, 1993 WL 306169, at
*2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 1993).
120. Id.
121. Key Pharm., Inc. v. Hercon Lab. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 299 (D. Del. 1997).
122. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Telectronics Pacing
Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
123. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
124. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
125. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
126. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass.
1998).
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female condom,' 28 a perfluorocarbon used in retinal surgery, 129 and




The Supreme Court addressed § 271(e)(1) again fifteen years later in its
Merck decision. The Court specifically refrained from expressing a view
about whether research tools were exempt from infringement under §
271(e)(1).13 ' The Court noted that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had
supported its narrower construction of § 271(e)(1) on the basis that the
narrower construction protected patentees of research tool patents.' 32 Since
the Supreme Court rejected this narrower construction and refused to
express an opinion about the exemption of research tools under § 271(e)(1),
there remains considerable doubt about whether research tools are exempt
under § 271 (e)(1).
However, at least one court has held that research tools are patented
inventions that can be exempt from infringement by virtue of § 271 (e)( 1).
133
Classen Immunotherapies (Classen) holds patents on methods of identifying
and commercializing new uses of existing drugs. 134 Elan Pharmaceuticals
(Elan) conducted a study that determined that food impacted significantly
the bioavailability of Skelaxin, a muscle reactant. 135 Elan included the study
127. NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
128. Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., No. 92-1556, 1993 WL 306169, at
*1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 1993).
129. Infinitech, Inc. v. Vitrophage, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. I11. 1994).
130. Baxter Diagnostics Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 798 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal.
1992).
131. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205 (2005).
132. Id.
133. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D.
Md. 2006).
134. Id. at 623.
135. Id. at 624.
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findings in a labeling supplement to its own NDA for Skelaxin that it
submitted to the FDA, and the FDA approved Elan's amendments to the
Skelaxin product label.136 In a Citizen's Petition that was ultimately granted,
Elan also requested that the FDA require Skelaxin ANDA applicants to
submit fed (studies conducted with patient taking Skelaxin with food) and
fasted (studies conducted with patients taking Skelaxin without food) studies
to the FDA.1 37 Classen sued Elan for infringement based on Elan's study
and the application of the study to identify and commercialize a new use for
Skelaxin. 38 Elan argued that even if its conduct fell within the scope of
Classen's patents, its actions were exempt from patent infringement under §
271(e)(1) because it had submitted the results of its study to the FDA.' 39 In
rendering its opinion, the district court pointed to the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of § 271(e)(1) in Merck and quoted the Court's language
when it stated that "there is simply no room in the statute for excluding
certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of research
in which it is developed or the particular submission in which it could be
included."' 40 The district court determined that since the results of the study
were submitted to the FDA in Elan's Citizen's Petition and labeling
supplement to its Skelaxin NDA, and because § 271(e)(1) made no
exclusions based on the particular submission in which information was
submitted to the FDA, Elan's activities were reasonably related to the
submission of information under the FDCA and § 271(e)(1) therefore
protected them from infringement. The court noted that the Supreme Court
had declined to rule on whether the use of research tools was protected under
§ 271(e)(1)."' The court then held that the Classen process could be
considered to be a research tool and extending the Safe Harbor to cover the
use of these tools was warranted by both the language in Merck and a plain





139. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 621, 624-
25 (D. Md. 2006).
140. Id. at 625 (citing Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I. Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202
(2005)).
141. Id. at 625.
142. Id..
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V. "[A] FEDERAL LAW WHICH REGULATES THE MANUFACTURE, USE, OR
SALE OF DRUGS"
In Eli Lilly, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs" to refer to an entire
statutory scheme of regulation and not just to single sections or subsections
related to drugs or veterinary biological products."'
143
In Merck, 144 the Supreme Court indicated that the Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) is "a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs."' 145 The Court also indicated that while the FDCA is
such a federal law, it is not necessarily the only one.146
VI. APPLICATION OF THE CASE LAW
The federal regulatory law and its requirements and guidelines are the
touchstone for the courts when determining the applicability of the Safe
Harbor to particular circumstances. Courts frequently refer to the
requirements or guidelines of the regulations to determine whether activity is
reasonably related to obtaining regulatory approval.
A. Relate to FDA Requirements and Guidelines
Courts generally agree that the Safe Harbor exemption is an affirmative
defense that defendants raise by asserting that their activities are exempt
from patent infringement under § 271(e)(1).' 47 As an affirmative defense,
the § 271(e)(1) exemption must be asserted by the defendant.'4a This
provides those seeking regulatory approval with the opportunity to take
143. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990).
144. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
145. Id. at 195.
146. Id. at 193.
147. See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (indicating that the § 271(e)(1) exemption is an affirmative defense); Ventrassist
Pty, Ltd. v. Heartware, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (concluding
that defendant raised an affirmative defense by asserting its activities were exempt from
patent infringement under § 271 (e)(l)).
148. Ventrassist Pty, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
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helpful steps before litigation arises that will make a Safe Harbor defense
easier to establish.
A Safe Harbor defense can be better prepared through regular
contemporaneous documentation of an activity's relation to FDA
information submission requirements and guidelines. It is important first to
be aware of the FDA guidelines and requirements, so that any activities can
be related to them in documentation. Records of this documentation should
be maintained. It is common practice during litigation for a patentee to
question the sincerity of defendant's assertions that activities are reasonably
related to the development and submission of regulatory information.
Documentation that is contemporaneous with the activity will assist the
defendant in rebutting a patentee's challenge of sincerity. Since such
documentation is created before litigation arises, it is helpful evidence that
courts appear to be comfortable using in determining that an activity is
protected under § 271 (e)(1).
For demonstrations at trade shows, care should be taken to document that
no sales or offers for sale occurred at the trade show. In determinations that
demonstrations at trade shows are exempt from patent infringement, the
absence of sales activity is a factor favoring exemption that courts rely on.
14 9
With respect to products or processes that could be characterized as
research tools, it may be worthwhile to characterize these products or
processes as drugs or medical devices, or processes involving the same in
this documentation. This may serve to support a characterization during
litigation that would be more certain to receive the benefit of Safe Harbor
protection. Such a characterization would also serve to take maximum
advantage of the Supreme Court's holding in Merck, regardless of how a
court ultimately classifies the products or processes at issue in litigation.'
50
B. Maximize Information Generation
Business planning should include being cognizant of the information
generating the potential of particular activities. As the cases have held, the
purpose of the activity does not preclude application of the Safe Harbor
exemption, and the generation of relevant information is very helpful in
establishing the Safe Harbor defense.
15
149. See supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
150. See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d
621, 625 (D. Md. 2006).
151. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass.
1998).
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Efforts should be made to maximize the information generated by
activities conducted during drug development. Thus, business development
plans can memorialize desires to enter markets in which regulatory approval
will be required. Market surveys can also document these business
intentions. These surveys can serve as helpful antecedent evidence of plans
to seek regulatory approval in markets where such approval is necessary to
sell products. Such evidence could be helpful in situations like Third Wave,
where a defendant who is still in the early stages of pursuing an FDA
regulated market needs to establish that past activity was performed in order
to develop or submit information to the FDA.
152
Although the process of obtaining regulatory approval can be uncertain,
the uncertainty does provide some advantages to those seeking regulatory
approval, including the fact that courts are aware of the uncertainty
surrounding the FDA's data requirements. As the Federal Circuit noted in
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., "it is unforeseeable how much data FDA
will require Ventritex to submit during the approval process. 153 Drug and
product developers can engage in a variety of activities without the fear of
infringement liability when these activities are generating information
relevant to the regulatory approval process.
C. Submit Information to the FDA
The actual submission of data generated by an activity to the FDA during
the regulatory process is very persuasive to courts when making Safe Harbor
determinations. Given that the purpose of the § 271(e)(1) exemption is to
exempt activities from infringement involved in the process of gaining
regulatory approval, and data submission is the mode by which regulatory
approval is obtained, this is obviously a powerful factor. The fact that data
were actually submitted to the FDA is often determinative of the § 271 (e)(1)
exemption for a court.
154
D. Keep FDA Informed
Making the FDA aware of the activity is another helpful step to take from
an evidentiary standpoint in establishing a Safe Harbor defense. Efforts
152. Third Wave Techs. v. Stratagene Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 891, 913 (W.D. Wis.
2005).
153. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., No. 92-1076, 1993 WL 87405, at *3
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993).
154. See, e.g.,Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir.
1992); NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
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should be made to keep the FDA informed of activities that are taking place.
Communications with the FDA should be memorialized in writing. In the
NeoRX decision, the court found it persuasive that the FDA was fully aware
of Immunomedics' scale-up production plans in holding that
Immunomedics' production of ImmunoRAID-CEA was reasonably related
to the FDA approval process. 55
VII. CONCLUSION
In the twenty-three years since the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, the
courts have applied the § 271(e)(1) in many different factual situations. In
analyzing the various factual patterns and submitted evidence in cases where
the Safe Harbor exemption applies, the data requirements of the FDA
regulations have emerged as a factor of great importance. If information is
generated that is relevant to the regulatory process or that is submitted to the
FDA, many activities will fall within the ambit of the Safe Harbor
exemption. Additionally, the unforeseeability of the amount of information
required by the FDA during the regulatory approval process can work as an
advantage for those seeking the Safe Harbor's protection. Thus, tailoring
activities to meet FDA requirements for information, generating, and
documenting relevant information from activities, and submitting
information to the FDA are optimal ways to avail an activity of the Safe
Harbor's protection. As the cases have shown, these simple and systematic
steps taken before and during an activity can be enormously helpful in
establishing a Safe Harbor defense.
155. NeoRX Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 206.
